Sources: Kuhn-1962-structure-of-scientific-revolutions, Kuhn-on-paradigms, Kuhn-on-normal-science, Kuhn-on-crisis-and-scientific-revolutions
Kuhn’s account provides compelling explanation for two central features of scientific development that other philosophers struggle to reconcile: the periods of stability during normal science and the occurrence of revolutionary science. Popper’s emphasis on constant falsification cannot explain why scientists productively work within established frameworks without constantly questioning fundamentals. Conversely, logical empiricism’s cumulative model cannot adequately explain discontinuous revolutions where fundamental commitments are overthrown and replaced either in part or as a whole.
Kuhn’s defines scientific progress not just by rational, objective facts but as a social aspect driven by communities. Paradigms are adopted as shared frameworks meant to inspire others, maintained through training, education, and community consensus. This communal structure explains both stability and change. During normal science, paradigm commitment enables coordinated, productive puzzle-solving within the scientific community. During crisis, anomalies accumulate until the scientific community loses confidence in its paradigm; the new paradigm is established when it wins over the community, allowing social forces, persuasion, and generation shifts to determine which new paradigm prevails. The process of paradigm shifts, as Kuhn describes, reveals science as a dynamic and socially influenced practice.
Kuhn’s account was the first I’d encountered that didn’t ask what science should look like — rationally, logically, objectively — but instead described how scientists actually behave. By grounding his account in historical examples rather than abstract ideals, Kuhn naturally ends up with a picture of science that is deeply social. Because science, at the end of the day, is a human endeavour.