Longino, H.E. (1994). "In Search of Feminist Epistemology". Monist 1994; 77 (4): 472-485.
Political motivations of feminist epistemology
Longino points out that women have been marginalized in traditional knowledge practices, and specifically in natural sciences, there has been a long history where women have been excluded from the practice. For Longino, this is one of the reasons for pursuing a feminist epistemology.
Of course, an argument can be made that there isn’t a need for a new epistemology, there just needs to be a political solution to sexism to solve the epistemological problem. In lieu of this argument, Longino offers a second motivation for feminist epistemology that might even be more compelling.
Longino identifies that two philosophical trends that create space for feminist epistemology.
- the development of Modern fallibilism (the idea that all knowledge is revisable; no belief is absolutely certain) and anti-foundationalism (the rejection that knowledge rests on basic beliefs) makes it possible to consider alternative influences on knowledge, like feminist factors. If epistemology no longer demands indubitable foundations, then maybe feminist perspectives could play a role in how knowledge is shaped
- naturalism (Quine-on-naturalized-epistemology) suggests that knowledge is conditioned by psychological and sociological factors, and so this leads to feminist epistemology where the psychological profile that describes women may have relevance to how we understand knowledge
finding a viable feminist epistemology
As the name of her paper suggest, Longino is attempting to develop a viable feminist epistemology in the mid-nineties, and this writing is in the early days of this branch of research so her aim is to make the case that it is a sensible notion.
Longino points out that while feminist epistemology could be valuable to describe the diversity of ways in which humans apprehend the world, such as describing uniquely feminine experiences (mensuration, childbirth, etc.) or uniquely feminine modes of learning, it is not explicitly epistemology.
Standpoint theories
Longino describes the notion of a standpoint as =
“A standpoint is a perspective afforded by social location…our beliefs about the world are developed from and reflect these standpoints.”
Longino cites Dorothy Smith’s application of standpoint theory to sociology, where the standard (dominant) sociological practice is derived from the bureaucratic male-dominated elite and is projected onto the populations being studied. This results in the sociologist’s own standpoint becoming embedded in his analysis, while the power relations that shape his perspectives remains invisible to him. Smith claims that by contrast, a woman’s sociological standpoint allows access to social aspects missed by the standard sociological practice as she acts as both an active subject and as an object shaped by the institutional characteristics.
For Longino, the problem with standpoint theory (as well as claiming feminine epistemology as a way to describe uniquely feminine experiences or modes of learning) is that it claims that there is some single, shared “female perspective” grounded in biology or universal experience. Longino insists that women’s experiences are diverse, shaped by race, class, sexuality and other factors, and thus cannot be grounded into a single epistemic standpoint.
Feminist approach to science
Longino’s suggestion for feminist epistemology is to participate in traditional knowledge-seeking practice as a feminist; consider how one might approach certain open questions that naturally arise in epistemology (or science) from a feminist perspective.
“To do epistemology as a feminist is to engage the questions of epistemology with an awareness of the ways in which participation in socially-sanctioned knowledge production has been circumscribed, of the ways in which epistemological concepts like rationality and objectivity have been defined using notions of masculinity … What is important for the feminine or the female here is the perspective it affords on the construction of the concept of knowledge and the window it opens on alternatives. But it functions as an object of reflection, not as a subject position.”
She demonstrates this by showing how a feminist intervention might come into play in the practice of science using the issue of underdetermination in science.
underdetermination is the idea that evidence supplied by observational data in scientific contexts does not suffice to uniquely determine the choice of a theory (or of an observational hypothesis, as Longino calls it) among alternatives. It follows that in order to settle theory choice, we need to appeal to background assumptions that might involve theories or beliefs from other bodies of knowledge.
For example, during the Renaissance, when it came to deciding whether to accept the helio-centered or the geo-centric hypothesis about the universe, background assumptions about the centrality of human beings to God’s creation were used in favor of the geo-centric model. Another example is Occam’s Razor can be used as a background assumption in favor of simple theory over a theory that explains the same thing in more complicated terms.
Since background assumptions can themselves be supported with some kind of evidential argument and evidence could never be truly enough, there is a risk of infinite regress. And so, there must be something else besides logic and experiential data involved in theory choice, as she puts it =
“To avoid an infinite regress, if one accepts some form of underdetermination argument, one must appeal to factors other than logic and observational and experimental data as grounds for hypothesis choice.”
This is an idea similar to Thomas Khun about underdetermination and he lists the kinds of factors that we might appeal to = accuracy, consistency, breadth of scope, simplicity, fruitfulness. These factors aren’t determined strictly on the basis of what we observe, and so reflect what can be called non-evidential standards associated with theory choice
Feminist standards in theory choice
Longino wants us to consider the non-evidential standards evoked by feminist concerns and values, in order to understand what it means to approach science as a feminist.
Longino provides examples of feminist standards that could serve the aims of a feminist approach to epistemology =
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empirical adequacy (accuracy) = agreement of the observational claims of a theory with the experimental data It can be stressed with a feminist outlook, showing e.g. drawing attention to unsupported biases in existing research, through faulty research designs, or improper statistical methodology
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novelty treating novelty as a standard reflects doubts on mainstream frameworks as adequate to the problems, and encourages alternative frameworks and new avenues of inquiry to emerge
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ontological heterogeneity the preference for explanations that do not homogenize phenomena or assume a single underlying essence e.g. preferring a hypothesis that stresses difference, and emphasizes them in an appropriate way, that shows that they are not being dismissed
“Ontological heterogeneity permits equal standing for different types and mandates investigation of the details of such difference. Difference is a resource, not a failure.”
Longino explains that theories of inferiority (claims that women or marginalized groups are naturally lesser) arise from a refusal to recognize genuine differences, and assumes that there is one single ideal that every other type must be measured against. This results in any who differs as a failed or incomplete version of the standard. Ontological heterogeneity, thus, opens the doors to scientific explanations that do not automatically frame certain people or traits as inferior.
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complexity of relationship feminist values recommend theories that emphasize interactional processes, and relational causality rather than simple linear explanations. This challenges models that treat biological or social traits as fixed, natural, or unidirectional.
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applicability to current human needs to create a context that is responsive to human well-being, especially the well-being of marginalized groups
“As expressed in feminist contexts, this is not just a call for more applied science, but for research that can be directed toward meeting the human and social needs traditionally ministered to by women.”
- Diffusion of power this push scientists to develop theories that recognize social power, acknowledge domination, and avoid embedding oppressive assumptions
These standards of theory choice provides material for philosophical/epistemological work. E.g. =
- reflecting on the possible interpretations and interrelations of the standards among each other.
- ongoing evaluation of the standards, in terms of their implementation, their utility, etc.
- reflecting on whether or not selected standards are helpful in achieving feminist goals
- reflecting on whether or not there are alternative sets of standards that could do the same kind of work
Bottom-line requirement
Longino’s bottom-line requirement for any set of standards adopted with a feminist attempt is that they “reveal or prevent the disappearing of the experience and activities of women and/or that they reveal or prevent the disappearing of gender”
“To say that this is a bottom line requirement for feminist knowers does not mean that making women and gender visible is all the standards do or that satisfying this requirement is the only reason for adopting them. It only means that this is the reason for feminist inquirers to adopt them.”
This suggests that the standards mentioned by Longino may not be intrinsically feminist standards, but they are standards that in their application address factors responsible for sexist bias in science and correct those bias by making gender and women visible in ways that alternative standards may not.