Reid, T. (1969). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Essay III, from chapters 4 and 6. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press. (Original work published in 1785)
Reid’s critique of Locke’s Memory criterion
Reid critiques Locke-memory-criterion by the argument of reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity) that the principles the view commits us to leads to contradictions.
The argument relies on the logic principle The transitivity of Identity = if and then
Reid gives the example of an officer at three different points in his life. The officer at age 25 remembers an event from when he was a schoolboy at age 10. By Locke’s memory criterion, the officer at age 25 is identical to the officer at age 10. Now, the officer at age 65 remembers an event from when he was 25, but doesn’t remember an event from when he was 10. By Locke’s memory criterion, the officer at age 65 cannot be numerically identical to the officer at age 10 because he no longer the events that occurred. BUT it follows by the transitivity of identity that the officer at age 10 is identical with the officer at age 65, leading to a contradiction.
Reid agrees with Locke that there is a connection between selfhood and memory; conscious memory provides existence of a continued self BUT it does not constitute the continuing self (it is not a necessary condition).
Reid’s view of the self
Reid gives the following account for defining Identity:
“If you ask a definition of identity, I confess I can give none; it is too simple a notion to admit of logical definition : I can say it is a relation, but I cannot find words to e:xptess the specific difference between this and other relations, though l am in no danger of confounding it with any other.”
Personhood, or selfhood, according to Reid, is not to be identified with anything that changes either physically or psychologically. For Reid, the self is a kind of permanent being:
“My thoughts, and actions, and feelings change every moment; they have no continued, but successive existence; but that self, or I, to which they belong, is permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, actions, and feelings, which I call mine.”
This contrasts with Locke-on-personal-identity as consciousness is always changing over time. Reid sees the self as a being that has consciousness and is subject of all the processes of transformation, but not to be identified with any of the processes.
- The identity of self = perfect identity (there is no variation in it)
- the self is indivisible into parts and calls it a monad
Problem’s with Reid’s view
- Reid claims that memory gives us evidence of a changeless, indivisible self, but doesn’t give more of an explanation than that.
- Reid doesn’t give any explanation on how the self is a changeless, indivisible being but still undergoes processes of change (thinking, reasoning, deliberating, suffering, etc.) It is a “just say so” story
- Reid claims that people have an unfailing conviction in the self being an unchanging indivisible being, that there is a natural kind of belief that such a being must exist. But this seems a bit reaching that there doesn’t seem to be much evidence or explanation of how this is so. How do we know that such a being exist?