Knowledge-of-universals analyzing-universals
Reading: Bertrand Russell (2014), "The world of universals" - Chapter 9 of "The Problems of Philosophy"
The notion of “universals” emerge when we take the idea of having “something in common” seriously. when comparing an ordinary piece of chalk and an ordinary piece of blank paper, we can say that the chalk and the paper have whiteness in common. What is whiteness though? It is implied that since whiteness is not exclusive to the chalk or the paper, it is a third thing that is common to both.
Another possible explanation for whiteness though is that the chalk’s whiteness is a just a part of the chalk, and similarly for the paper’s whiteness; each has their own quality of whiteness (there is no third thing). BUT we’re not taking the idea of having something in common seriously anymore. There is no longer somehing in common between the chalk and the paper as they have their own distinct versions of whiteness. Russell uses this as his argument of why there must be such entities as universals.
particulars = objects that our senses acquaint us with.
- a paper, or one person repaying a debt to another
universals = qualities, characterisitics, or natures that can be common to many particular objects, situated in different places and different times.
- Universals characterizes particular objects, but they are entities distinct from the particulars they characterize
term property is synonymous with the term universal
- “Chalk has the property of whiteness”
Notes from the reading
Russell on Plato’s theory
plato’s theory of ideas is an attempt to understand “universals” and according to Russell “one of the most successful attempts”
- Plato calls entities like whiteness or justice having this pure essence that a number of particular things have in common as ideas or forms.
“Not being paticular, [a universal] cannot itself exist in the world of sense.” (Russell, 2014)
- they are not changeable like the things of sense; they are “eternally themselves, immutable, and indestructible”
Thus Plato is led to a supra-sensible world, more real than the common world of sense, the unchangeable world of ideas, which alone gives to the world of sense whatever pale reflection of reality may belong to it. The truly real world, for Plato, is the world of ideas …
Summary of Plato’s theory by Russell:
“The essence of the sort of entity Plato meant is that it is opposed to the particular things that are given in sensation. We speak of whatever is given in sensation, or is of the same nature as things given in sensation, as a particular; by opposition to this, a universal will be anything which may be shared by many particulars, and has those characteristics which, as we saw, distinguish justice and whiteness from just acts and white things” (Russell, 2014)
So, universals do not exist in the world of sense but are somehow shared by many particulars that do inhabit the world of sensation.
Types of Universals
Russell points out several different types of universals.
- qualities = (e.g. whiteness) specific features that we might refer t if we were describing something
- universals related to kinds / sortal properties = (e.g. human beings) referring to the nature or common characteristics that belong to all members of the kind
- relational universals / relational properties = (e.g. to the left of) referring to a relation between certain particulars
Are universals real?
To dispute the idea that universals are merely mental, he uses the example of the relational universal “north of” in Edinburgh is north of London:
“Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it…. [W]e do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary, we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth’s surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe.”
“The relation is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.”
“north of” does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh or London exists. As Russell says:
“Everything that can be apprehended by the senses … exists at some particular time. Hence the relation ‘north of’ is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.”
This account of universals by Russell gives a strange description: it is not accessible to the senses, nor do they exist in time or space.
Russell argues that to consider universals as mental (an act of thought) is to “rob it of its essential quality of universality”:
“One man’s act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man’s; one man’s act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man’s act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought opposed to its object no two different men could as think of it, and no one man could think of it twice.”
An argument from language
According to Russell, when examining common words, certain words denotes particulars:
- proper nouns (e.g. Bertrand Russell)
- pronouns (e.g. I, he, she …) — it is by context that we know what particulars they stand for
- descriptive phrases that is about a single individual (e.g. my cute cat)
There are also words that do not stand for particulars — and so are words that refer to universals:
- words like triangle, house, person, etc. (these refers to a type of object, without singling out any particular version of that object)
- adjectives = referring to characteristics that many particulars can possess
- prepositions (e.g. above, below, north of) = relations that have a general application and do not refer to any particulars
- verbs (e.g. I like this) = like prepositions, they do not refer to particulars.
- In fact, it could be said that like stands for a relational universal as “liking something” would be a relation that hold between many different pairings of people and preferences
Russell’s argument:
“It will be seen that no sentence can be made up without at least one word which denotes a universal … Thus, all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths involves acquaintance with universals”
where
- premise = “It will be seen that no sentence can be made up without at least one word which denotes a universal.”
- conclusion = “all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths involves acquaintance with universals”
Now, note that the premise already presupposes the existence of universals. There is also a big leap from the premise to the conclusion; the premise is referring to sentences and how all sentences have universals, while the conclusion is referring to all truths. (Are all sentences = all truths? what does he mean by knowledge of truths?)
Argument against Nominalism
In this argument, Russell critiques the opposing view of Nominalism that uses the notion of resemblance.
Russell’s objection with Nominalism is that the resemblance applies across many different pairs, and so it behaves exactly like a universal. So, nominalism presupposes the existence of at least one universal.
In rejecting univerals, the nominalist explains everything in terms of relations, but the very concept of resemblance stands as a universal. Thus, nominalism ends up presupposing what it denies. Russell concludes that universals are ontologicaly unavoidable.