Source: Douglas, H. (2007). Rejecting the Ideal of Value‐Free Science. In H. Kincaid, J. Dupré, & A. Wylie (Eds.), Value-Free Science? (1st ed., pp. 120–140). Oxford University Press, New York. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195308969.003.0009
also check out: Kuhn, Thomas (1977), “Objectivity, Value, and Theory Choice”, in The Essential Tension, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 320-339.
The Value-free ideal of science holds that science should be guided only by epistemic values in its internal stage.
This ideal distinguishes:
- external parts of science = research ethics before project begins and tech applications afterwards
- internal parts of science = during the course of research itself (e.g. within the lab and writing up the results)
epistemic values = term to encompass the values acceptable in science as guidance for theory choice because they contribute to scientific knowledge.
- accuracy of instruments,
- measures of certainty and uncertainty,
- parsimony (simpler theories are better than complicated theories),
- logical consistency,
- falsifiability for popper-1934-logic-of-scientific-discovery, etc. There is debate on what counts as epistemic values (like parsimony or falsifiability)
non-epistemic values = required in the “external” parts of science (such as for choice of projects, limitations of methodology like use of human subjects, and the application of science related technologies)
- political beliefs,
- what research should be conducted on human/non-human subjects,
- choosing to do research based on availability of funding (profit-motive),
- activities that are considered valuable for reasons other knowledge (e.g. prestige, addressing problems for human beings),
- ethical values
Why does the value-free ideal persist?
Douglas identifies several reasons scientists and philosophers maintain the value-free ideal:
- protects scientific objectivity = views like logical-empiricism want scientific knowledge to be based solely on evidence, and free from subjective values1
- Division of labor = scientists discovered facts, while policy-makers made the value judgements about what to do with them
- shield scientists from responsibility = if science is value-free (and the value decisions are made by other people), scientists are able to do science without constantly thinking about the ethical implications of their work
Douglas’ Thesis: The ideal is unattainable and undesirable
Main claim = For policy-relevant science, we need to reject the value free ideal. Non-epistemic values are logically needed for reasoning in science and the rejection of the value-free ideal does not demolish science’s objectivity
Douglas argues that the value-free ideal is unattainable because scientists must be the ones to make choices that that require weighing consequences of errors, which necessarily involves value judgements. It is undesirable because pretending science is value-free doesn’t eliminate values, it merely hides them and makes science less transparent and less democratically accountable as values creep back in subconsciously regardless.
Core arguments
- Douglas-on-choices-and-values-in-science = choices under uncertainty require weighing false positives and false negatives, which involve value judgements about consequence
- even routine scientific work (characterizing data, selecting methods, interpreting result) involves choices with potential for error
- Douglas-on-scientist-responsibility = scientists should be held to the same standards as everyone else and cannot be effectively shielded from making value judgements
- science can remain objective even if we reject the value-free ideal
Feminist criticism of the value-free ideal
Longino argues that value-free science is unattainable because contextual can influence the ways constitutive values are interpreted and weighed. More importantly, value freedom is undesirable because contextual values can play epistemically beneficial roles in science.
Link to original
Footnotes
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Douglas, p.5 ↩