In section 3 of Douglas-2007-rejecting-value-free-science, Douglas argues why scientists should be held to the same moral responsibility as everyone else. Since choices-in-science-involve-value-judgements, scientists shouldn’t be exempted from considering those consequences. The responsibility cannot be effectively transferred to others (policy-makers, ethics board, etc.) without either sacrificing scientific autonomy or producing impractical oversights.
Douglas identifies two general objections to her view, arguing that scientists shouldn’t have to consider non-epistemic values:
- Scientists should focus on epistemic values and leave implications to policy-makers
- Scientists should be shielded from having to think about consequences in order to protect the value-neutrality of science
Douglas argues that both objections fail, leaving the burden of responsibility with scientists.
Response to objection 1
Some scientists argue that scientist do not need to consider values because:
- they are not the ones making policy decisions where consequences matter
- they are simply reporting the data for decision-makers to use
Douglas’ Rat Liver tissue example demonstrates that even reporting raw data involves choices that have potential for error and require value judgements.
Not only this, but it is rare for scientists to report solely the raw data to policy makers because policy-makers rarely have the requisite expertise to interpret the data, such as they might not understand the technical details, cannot asses the reliability of methods, can’t judge the significance of results.
Hence, scientist must interpret their findings for policy makers that require both epistemic and non-epistemic value considerations, such as
- selecting background assumptions
- assessing which kinds of errors are more likely under different assumptions
- judging how serious different potential errors should be
- determining what level of certainty is important
“In short, we cannot effectively use scientific information without scientific interpretation, but interpretation involves value considerations. And few outside the scientific community are equipped to make those interpretations. So scientists usually must interpret their findings for policy-makers and the public.” p. 13
Douglas notes that scientists performing the research may be the only ones who are both aware of the uncertainties involved and the likely consequences of the errors.
- Example: Theoretical physicists working on nuclear weapons realized there was a possibility a nuclear explosion might ignite the atmosphere. This potential error could only have been identified and considered by those experts.
Response to objection 2
Some argue that scientists should be exempt from moral judgements that the rest of us are held to in order to solely focus on the search of truth.
Douglas interprets this to mean that
“scientists may make dubious choices with severe consequences of error, but we would not ask them to think about those consequences and would not hold them responsible if and when they occur.” p. 13
which when phrased like that sounds absurd.
Douglas highlights two possibilities in which this could be possible:
- if we thought epistemic values always trumped other values = truth-seeking overrides all other considerations
- if someone else with authority to make decisions regarding research choices could make value judgements at each stage If both fail, responsibility falls on the scientist.
Why epistemic values do not always trump societal values = it is clear that this is not the case. For instance, there are limits on the use of human/non-human subjects in research, test bans on nuclear weapons, research funding debates (weighing epistemic gain against cost) etc., which shows that we are not willing to sacrifice everything for the search for truth. In other words, epistemic values are not the end-all-be-all.
Why third-party oversight is impractical = even if there was a third-party that the scientific expertise and policy training, the third-party would need to be involved in every stage of the scientific process, looking over the scientists’ shoulders at every choice whhich is impractical, expensive, and strips scientists of autonomy as it becomes impossible to do independent scientific work.
“This division of authority would likely lead to resentment among the scientists and to a reduced reflection by scientists on the potential consequences of research. After all, increased reflection would only complicate the scientist’s research by requiring more intensive consultation with the ethical overseer.” p. 16