Prompt: In defending his view of universals, Russell maintains that universals dont inhabit the world of sense (i.e., the world of particular objects known by sensory experience). However, he also maintains that our knowledge of at least some universals is a posteriori having a basis in our acquaintance with sense-data. In your own words, explain how these two claims might be reconciled. Then. evaluate the proposed reconciliation. Does it succeed in showing that Russel’s position is consistent? why or why not? Argue for your position.
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Bertrand Russell’s attempt to reconcile a realist metaphysical claim of universals with an empirical epistemeology — by insisting that some universals are known a posteriori through acquaintance with sense-data — is consistent only if one accepts Russell’s notion of acquaintance at face value, i.e. as a primitive relation. This, however, comes at cost of explanatory depth, as we are asked to accept a mysterious faculty without a clear account of how it works.
Russell endorses two claims that initially seem at odd. Ontologically, he treats, universals as real, non-spatical, non-temporal entities that do not inhabit the world of sense but are nevertheless shared by many particulars (L2, W1). Epistemologically, he asserts that knowledge of at least some universals, (called sensible universals), is a posteriori, obtained through sensory acquaintance with particulars. He distinguishes this as knowledge by acquaintance, contrasting knowledge by description which is a priori. The tension that arises: how can experience give us knowledge of non-empirical entities that do not belong to world of sense?
Russell attempts to resolve this dilemma by claiming that when we perceive particulars (e.g. a white patch), we are directly acquainted not only with that particular but also with the universal it instantiates (e.g. whiteness). We then abstract the property from the particulars that share it (Russell, p. xxx). This forms the basis of his reconciliation between the metaphysical claim that universals are real and the epistemological claim that some are known a posteriori.
To put it simply, Russell maintains that acquaintance with a universal requires the process of abstraction. Abstraction is the mental act by which we recognize what different particulars have in common (L3, W1). Central here is Russell’s notion of acquaintance: he insists that it is not inference or construction, but a form of direct awareness. As he writes, “Our immediate knowledge of things, which we called acquaintance, consists of two sorts, according as the things known are particulars or universals.” (p. 64) For Russell, acquaintance functions as a primitive relation, while abstraction is our way of recognizing the universal that acquaintance has already presented to us.
However, this reconciliation only holds if we accept acquaintance entirely at face value. The moment we ask how acquaintance manages to bridge the sensible world of particulars with the non-empirical realm of universals, Russell’s explanation begins to weaken. His account ultimately depends on treating acquaintance as a primitive, unanalyzable link between subject and universal, which delivers universals to us directly alongside particulars. This secures the consistency of his position, but only at the cost of explanatory depth. Without further explanation of how acquaintance connects us to universals, this amounts to a “just so” story: acquaintance does the job because Russell tells us it does.
Futhermore, Russell himself concedes that “among universals, there seem to be no principle by which we can decide which can be known by acquaintance.” (p. 64) This admission highlights the vagueness of his position. Even if we accept acquaintance as primitive, Russell offers no way to determine its scope. Why accept that we can know some universals directly, but not others? The reconciliation is thus fragile, lacking both explanation and boundaries.
The relation between acquaintance and abstraction in Russell’s explanation also introduces possible circular reasoning. If acquaintance already provides us with the universal, then abstraction seems redundant. Conversely, if abstraction is what allows us to apprehend universals, then acquaintance is no longer a direct relation, which creates inconsistencies. Moreover, the two notions seem to lean on each other. Abstraction requires acquaintance, since one can only abstract properties one is already acquainted with. But acquaintance also seems to require abstraction, for without it we could not recognize the universal among particulars. Instead of yielding a clear two-step account, Russell risks collapsing the two into a single ambiguous process: acquaintance explains universals only if abstraction is presupposed, yet abstraction only works if acquaintance is already in place.
Finally, because acquaintance is primitive, indeterminate, and ambiguously tied to abstraction, it ends up doing far too much theoretical work. It is supposed to explain how we know both particulars and universals, ranging from colors and shapes to spatial relations and even logical forms. Yet it does so without a clear mechanism, principle, or boundary. Acquaintance becomes a catch-all “we just can” explanation, one that shoulders the burden of connecting us to entities outside time and space, leaving the reconciliation at risk of looking like a placeholder.
Russell’s reconciliation does succeed in showing that his position is formally consistent, but only by appealing to acquaintance as a primitive relation. Once that notion is granted, the two claims sit together without contradiction. Yet I argue that this reconciliation ultimately fails to satisfy, because it leaves us with a mysterious faculty doing too much explanatory work, and collapses into something more like a stipulation than an account.