Rolin-2021-Analytic-Feminist-Approaches

Source Rolin, Kristina, (2021), ‘Philosophy of Science Analytic Feminist Approaches’, in Kim Q. Hall, and Ásta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Philosophy (online edn, Oxford Academic, 12 May 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190628925.013.17,

Bias paradox =

“how is it possible to criticize gender bias as epistemically harmful while at the same time hold the view that all scientific knowledge is socially situated and partial in some ways” (p. 227)

Three strategies to respond to the bias paradox, acknowledging the socially situated and partial nature of scientific knowledge:

1. critical contextual empiricism
2. feminist radical empiricism
3. feminist standpoint empiricism

Critical contextual empiricism

Longino (2002) solves the bias paradox by norms applicable to scientific communities.

The best way to identify and eliminate epistemically harmful biases is to subject all scientific research to the deliberation of a scientific community that is socially diverse and responsive to criticism.

It argues for a social account of objectivity because values belonging to the social and cultural context of science can legitimately have an impact on the background assumptions scientists rely on in evidential reasoning. It is based on the idea that a diverse community can identify and critique implicit assumptions that are informed by harmful biases.

Four criteria for social community of science = to ensure scientific objectivity, communities must meet the four criteria

1. publicly recognized venues
2. uptake of criticism
3. public standards
4. tempered equality

A criticism of this view is that it is too equitable in allowing views to be guaranteed uptake (like racism or sexism) and so there should be more thought about what uptake should involve.

Feminist radical empiricism

Based on two theses =

1. web of valief = an all-encompassing network of evidence, background assumptions, and values that can be tested as a whole empirically
   • value judgements are not “science-free” and that they are open to revision in light of experience
   • values have empirical content that can be evaluated by empirical means
2. empirical success of feminism = feminist values increase the empiricial adequacy of scientific research

This view treats social and ethical values as subject to empirical revision and investigation, similar to scientific hypotheses, and that feminist perspectives can improve scientific objectivity by identifying and revising biased research assumptions.

Problems with this view includes that it is based on hope that empirical evidence will compel people to change their values, which is not always the case. There can also be epistemically successful values that are not good moral values. There is also the question of how does one test values empirically?

Feminist Standpoint empiricism

This is talked about in Longino on standpoint theories and further mentioned in Mills-on-alternative-epistemology.

Standpoint theory can be summarized in three theses:

1. situated knowledge thesis =  all scientific knowledge is socially situated and partial
   • feminist standpoint empiricists are focused on social locations that track systemic relations of power and social inequalities
2. thesis of epistemic advantage = those who are unprivileged with respect to their social locations may have an advantage when it comes to gaining knowledge of some aspects of social reality.
   • those from socially marginalized groups can draw on their social experience as an epistemic resource not available for those in dominant positions in the society
3. achievement thesis =  since unprivileged or marginal social locations are a source of epistemic advantage, the advantage is a collective achievement
   • developing a standpoint is a political project that involves community building
   • social and political activism, community grass-roots is part of forming standpoint